This supplemental appendix to the paper "Using Regression Discontinuity to Uncover the Personal Incumbency Advantage" is intended for online publication only. In the following section, we show how the model in the main body of the paper, which was developed only for open seats at t where no incumbent retires at t + 1, can be generalized to cases where some incumbents retire at t + 1. Next, we show that our model in the paper can be written in terms of potential outcomes, and discuss how our double-counting result can be obtained directly from a potential outcomes based model. Finally, in the last section, we present balance and placebo tests to investigate the validity of the regression discontinuity (RD) design in our dataset of northern open-seat U.S. House elections.
Generalizing the Model
In this subsection, we show how the model for where no incumbent is running at t ("open seats at t") presented in the main body of the paper can be generalized to all kinds of seats.
In doing this generalization, it becomes clear that the double-counting phenomenon is not exclusive to open seats at t, but also occurs in seats where an incumbent is running at t. As we show, however, in this latter set of seats recovering the personal incumbency advantage from the RD effect is complicated by the fact that, unlike in our open seats model where we invoke a scare-off effect, the sign of the quality differential cannot be determined.
We model district's i Democratic Vote share at election t + 1 ,v it+1 , as follows
where the different terms are described below:
• P ar it+1 is the district's Par at t + 1: the baseline vote for a party in a district, given district's partisanship, election year's partisan trend, no incumbent candidate, and Democratic and Republican candidates of average quality.
• D it+1 and R it+1 are the added quality of the Democratic and Republican candidates, respectively, running at t + 1 in district i, above the quality of the average open seat candidate in their respective parties as measured by Par (so D it+1 = 0 and R it+1 = 0 by construction in an open seat -i.e., open seat candidates are of average quality, which is measured in Par).
• As a result, (D it+1 − R it+1 ) is the quality differential between Democratic and Republican candidates running at t + 1 To see this more clearly, decompose Z it+1 as
where sign· denotes the sign function (sign
Taking the expectation of v it+1 conditional on v it = v, we obtain:
We define the right and left limits of the expectation of v it+1 conditional on v it = v:
We also use the superscript w and l to denote the right and left limits of the expectation of any of the other random variables in the model conditional on v it = v. Intuitively, we think of v 
where we have assumed that, in a neighborhood of the 1/2 cutoff, incumbents' decisions to retire are independent of the candidate quality differential (so the limit of
± ] as tends to zero we can be factorized as
where
): partisanship of barely-winner districts minus partisanship of barely-loser districts 1 As in the paper, we use the term barely-winner to refer to districts where the Democratic party barely won the t election, and the term barely-loser to to refer to districts where the Democratic party barely lost the t election.
• (D We make the following simplifying assumptions:
• The RD condition (P ar Under these assumptions, the RD estimand simplifies to:
Thus, we can recover the personal incumbency advantage, θ + QD, from the RD design
Note that, in the special case where no incumbent elected at t retires at t + 1, we have θ+QD = τ RD /2. But our model is more general and applies to contexts where the retirement rate is positive at t+1 (as long as retirement is non-strategic); as shown above, in this general case, the correction factor is (I w t+1 + I l t+1 ), the proportion of incumbents who seek reelection in the treatment group plus the proportion of incumbents who seek reelection in the control group, which will be a number less than 2.
Note also that in this general model QD can be either positive or negative. On the one hand, incumbents may be of higher average quality than challengers due to a scare-off effect. But on the other hand, parties may recruit high-quality challengers at t + 1 to target seemingly vulnerable incumbents who barely survived at t.
In the main body of the paper, we restricted the analysis to open seats at t. We did this for two reasons. First, because applying this restriction to the U.S. House elections we analyze, there are almost no incumbent retirements, which eliminates the need to assume that retirements are non-strategic. Second, because it makes plausible the assumption that freshman incumbents in both barely-winner and barely-loser districts are higher average quality than challengers, QD > 0, since it eliminates the possibility of strategic entry of candidates that is likely to occur at t + 1 in seats where incumbents barely survived or challengers barely succeeded.
Model in potential outcomes notation
We now write down the problem in terms of potential outcomes, and show the assumptions under which this potential outcomes framework leads to the model we outlined in the main body of the paper.
The term "potential outcomes" refers to all possible values of the Democratic vote share given all possible combinations of Democratic party winning or losing at election t and the incumbent elected at t running for reelection or retiring at t + 1. The notation is as follows:
• v it+1 is the observed Democratic vote share at election t + 1.
• W it = 1 if Democratic party won election t , W it = 0 if Democratic party lost election t.
• I R it+1 = 1 if Republican incumbent running at t + 1 election (decision made before election t + 1 is held)
• I D it+1 = 1 if Democratic incumbent running at t + 1 election (decision made before election t + 1 is held)
• There are six potential outcomes, written v it+1 (i, j, k), where -i th position indicates whether Democratic party won at t -j th position indicates whether Democratic incumbent is running at t + 1 -k th position indicates whether Republican incumbent is running at t + 1
The six potential outcomes are illustrated in Table S1 below. Assuming there are no intervening elections between t and t + 1, of these six potential outcomes, two are unfeasible:
if the Democratic party wins at t, there can be either a Democratic incumbent candidate running at t + 1 or no incumbent running, but there can be no Republican incumbent; similarly, if the Republican party wins at t, there can be either a Republican incumbent candidate running at t + 1 or no incumbent running, but it is not possible to have a Democratic incumbent. This was also noted and incorporated into our model in the main body of the paper. The two unfeasible potential outcomes are illustrated in the shaded cells of Table S1 . 
Shaded cells indicate unfeasible outcomes.
Given these potential outcomes, the observed outcome, v it+1 , can be written as follows:
We impose the following structure
or that, in other words, the Democratic vote share is always the same in an open seat, regardless of whether the Democratic party won or lost the previous election. This is the same assumption we made in our model. In other words, we assume that the Democratic vote share is always the same in an open seat, regardless of whether the Democratic party won or lost the previous election. Moreover, Par is the baseline vote for the party in district i at t + 1, given the district's partisanship, the election year's partisan trend, no incumbent candidate, and Democratic and Republican candidates of average quality.
We also assume that
and
In other words, we assume that the Democratic party gains the same amount (θ > 0 ) when a Democratic incumbent candidate is running, as it loses when a Republican incumbent is running. This is the same assumption made in our model in the main body of the paper, where we assumed that the incumbency advantage is the same for both parties, and equal to θ. Unlike in the paper, for simplicity, we do not consider candidate quality in this derivation, but we could add another term to the expression above so that
, where QD it+1 is the quality differential.
The condition about "exogeneity" of retirement decisions is incorporated in the condition Imposing these conditions simplifies the expression for v it+1 :
Now we take expectations
The RD estimand is the difference between the right and left limits of E(v it+1 |v it = v):
Therefore,
Assuming continuity of P ar it+1 (so that left and right limits coincide), we obtain:
Alternative conditions
Alternatively, we could impose the more flexible structure:
where C it+1 is the baseline vote for the party in district i at t + 1, given the district is held by an incumbent, the district's partisanship, the election year's partisan trend (we do not assume candidate quality plays a role to simplify the calculations, but if quality does play a role, we include it in C it+1 . This leads to
Again, we take expectations
The RD estimand is now:
Which is a more general expression and requires additional conditions to recover θ as above. In particular, a set of sufficient conditions is:
1. Local independence between retirement decisions and C it+1 and P ar it+1
2. The average decision to run for reelection after barely winning is the same for Democrats and Republicans, or, more precisely, equality of the limits w: lim v→
These conditions lead, again, to
4 Validity checks on U.S. House data: Open seats,
1968-2008
In this section, we report covariate balance and placebo tests to test the validity of the RD design in the sample of the U.S. House elections that we use in our main analysis in the paper. As mentioned in the paper, our sample consists of all U.S. House elections in non-southern states in the period that had no incumbent running at t. We perform tests in our sample, and also in the original data used by Caughey and Sekhon (2011) less. The first two columns show the mean in the treatment group (districts where the Democratic party won election t) and the mean in the control group (districts where the Democratic party lost election t), respectively. The third column shows the p-value associated with a t-test of difference in means, and the fourth column shows the p-value associated with a randomization-based test of the null hypothesis that the treatment has no effect on any district -the test statistic is a difference in means, and a fixed-margins randomization is assumed, see Cattaneo et al. (2013) for details. The last two columns contain the sample size in the treated and control groups, respectively. As shown in the table, the only statistically significant difference occurs for the Democratic Vote Share at t + 1 (first row), which is the outcome of our incumbency advantage analysis and where we expect to see an effect. For the other variables considered, all of which are pre-treatment covariates, the treatment effect cannot be statistically distinguished from zero. These covariates are Democratic Victory at t − 1, percent of donations received by the Democratic candidate at t − 1, the DWNominate score of the incumbent, and the Congressional Quarterly rating (coded 1 for leaning Democratic, 0 for tossup and -1 for leaning Republican). (The percentage of donations cannot be tested due to the small number of observations.) These covariates were compiled by Caughey and Sekhon (2011) and are part of their original dataset, which we use in this analysis. Table S3 is analogous to Table S2 but using our own dataset, which is based on Congressional
Quarterly's Voting and Elections Collection (for this reason, we refer to it as the Congressional Quarterly (CQ) data). Once again, the only statistically significant effect is observed for our outcome of interest, and we observe no effect on the two pre-treatment covariates we report (Democratic Victory at t − 1 and Democratic Vote Share at t − 1).
In addition to balance tests in the [−0.5, +0.5] window around the cutoff, we estimated placebo RD effects for the same pre-treatment covariates using a local linear regression with triangular kernel and mean-square error (MSE) optimal bandwidth. We used the plug-in MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2013a) , but all results remain unchanged if we use the bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) . We report conventional p-values as well as the robust p-values developed by Calonico et al. (2013a) . All estimations were performed with the Stata package rdrobust by Calonico et al. (2013b) . Note: RD effects using local linear regression within specified bandwidth and triangular kernel for non-southern races in period 1968-2008 where no incumbent is running at t. Bandwidth is the mean-squared-error optimal proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2013) . P-val conventional reports the conventional p-value associated with a test of null hypothesis that effect is zero. P-val robust reports the robust p-value associated with a test of null hypothesis that effect is zero developed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2013) . Note: RD effects using local linear regression within specified bandwidth and triangular kernel for non-southern races in period 1968-2008 where no incumbent is running at t. Bandwidth is the mean-squared-error optimal proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2013) . P-val conventional reports the conventional p-value associated with a test of null hypothesis that effect is zero. P-val robust reports the robust p-value associated with a test of null hypothesis that effect is zero developed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2013) . Table S4 uses the same restricted Caughey-Sekhon data used in Table S1 , and reports placebo RD effects for the same variables. The first column reports the MSE-optimal bandwidth, the second column reports the RD effect, the third column reports the conventional p-value associated with the null hypothesis that the RD effect is zero, and the last column shows the robust p-value developed by Calonico et al. (2013a) . Once again, the only significant effect we observe is for the outcome, with the single exception of CQ rating, which is significant at 5% according to the conventional p-value but not according to the robust p-value. Table S5 reports uses our data to estimate RD effects and reports the same variables analyzed in Table S3 . Once again, the only significant effect is for the outcome, and the effects for Democratic Vote Share and Democratic Victory at t − 1 are highly insignificant.
Non-retirement samples
This section presents Tables S6, S7 , S8, and S9, which are analogous to Tables S2, S3 , S4, and S5, respectively, with the only difference that they exclude the very few incumbents who are elected at t but do not seek reelection in the following election, at t + 1.
As can be seen, the conclusions remain unchanged -as is expected, since retirements in our sample are extremely few and, we believe, non-strategic. Once again, the only statistically significant effects are those for the outcome, Democratic Vote Share at t + 1, and there is no evidence of effects for any of the pre-treatment covariates -the only exception is CQ rating, which in Table   S8 appears significant at 5%. Note: RD effects using local linear regression within specified bandwidth and triangular kernel for non-southern races in period 1968-2008 where no incumbent is running at t. Bandwidth is the mean-squared-error optimal proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2013) . P-val conventional reports the conventional p-value associated with a test of null hypothesis that effect is zero. P-val robust reports the robust p-value associated with a test of null hypothesis that effect is zero developed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2013) . Note: RD effects using local linear regression within specified bandwidth and triangular kernel for non-southern races in period 1968-2008 where no incumbent is running at t. Bandwidth is the mean-squared-error optimal proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2013) . P-val conventional reports the conventional p-value associated with a test of null hypothesis that effect is zero. P-val robust reports the robust p-value associated with a test of null hypothesis that effect is zero developed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2013) .
